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ESTATE
PLANNING
Transferring
Assets to Your Minor Children
In many cases, it makes sense for
a parent/taxpayer to start transferring his wealth to his children well
before the end of his own life expectancy and even before his children
have reached their majority. There are two primary advantages to making
such transfers. The first advantage is that of estate tax savings. When
assets are transferred by the taxpayer and he retains no control over their
ultimate disposition, they will not be included in the taxpayer's estate
for federal estate tax purposes upon his death. Also, any appreciation
in the value of the assets following their transfer would not be included
in the taxpayer's estate.
The second advantage to making transfers
of assets to the next generation at a relatively early point in the taxpayer's
life is the nontax advantage of securing the inheritance of the taxpayer's
descendants and safeguarding resources that can be used for their present
needs, such as education. The taxpayer can retain control as to the amounts
to be distributed and as to the purposes for which the distributions can
be used.
One means of transferring property
to a minor without giving the minor immediate control of it is to establish
a custodianship for the minor. Such a transfer is an outright gift that
resembles a trust because it is held and administered by a third person
(the "custodian") who has the power to expend the custodial property for
the use and benefit of the minor. If the donor is himself the custodian,
however, there is a possibility that the full value of the transferred
property would be included in the donor's estate for federal estate tax
purposes.
An alternative means of transferring
property to a minor is through the use of a trust for the minor's benefit.
In order to secure tax savings, the trust has to satisfy the following
Internal Revenue Service requirements. First, the transfer has to be for
the benefit of a minor, meaning an individual who has not attained age
21 as of the date of the transfer. The trust must provide that trust income
and principal may be used for the donee's benefit prior to his reaching
age 21 and any income and principal not expended for the donee's benefit
during his minority must pass to the donee upon his attainment of age 21.
If the donee dies before reaching age 21, such unexpended income and principal
must be paid either to the donee's estate or as the donee might appoint.
The trust can provide that when the minor reaches age 21 he has a limited
period in which he can force immediate distribution of the trust fund.
If such power is not exercised, the trust can continue on its own terms.
If the foregoing requirements are
met, the donor of the trust is allowed the advantage of an Internal Revenue
Code gift tax provision that has become a familiar feature of gift-giving
programs. A donor is permitted to exclude from the total gifts made in
the tax year the first $10,000 of a gift made to an individual. If the
donor's spouse joins in the gift (the spouse need not have any interest
in the property being transferred), the exclusion is $20,000. Stated simply,
either $10,000 or $20,000 worth of property can be transferred by a donor
free of federal gift tax to a single individual in a given tax year. Such
a gift can be repeated in each succeeding year.
In regard to the gift tax exclusion
where the transfer is in trust, the exclusion applies only to the transfer
of a "present interest." A right to a distribution of trust principal at
the termination of a trust constitutes a future and not a present interest.
Were it not for the special dispensation given in the case of a trust for
the benefit of a minor, a transfer to such a trust would typically not
qualify for the $10,000/$20,000 exclusion because the transfer would not
be of a present interest.
The Internal Revenue Code, however,
eliminates the "present interest" requirement where the trust is for the
benefit of a minor and the requirements described above are satisfied.
Thus, if amounts no greater than the annual exclusion are given to the
trust for the benefit of a minor each year, such transfers would escape
gift tax and would not be subject to estate tax upon the donor's death.
The donor's appointment of himself as trustee would not negate the tax
benefit.
Trusts and other estate planning
instruments require careful planning and knowledge of the law. Always consult
a qualified professional for advice on estate planning issues.
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TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT
Is a "Hog"
Always a "Harley"?
A federal appellate court answered
that question in a recent trademark infringement suit, in which the defendant
operated a motorcycle repair shop known as "The Hog Farm." In his promotional
materials, he prominently displayed the bar-and-shield design mark owned
by Harley-Davidson, the renowned manufacturer of large motorcycles. The
defendant's materials also referred to his business as an "Unauthorized
Dealer." Harley sued to forbid the defendant's infringing use of Harley's
design trademark and his use of the term "hog," for which Harley claimed
protection as a trademark.
For many years, motorcycle aficionados
informally used the term "hog" to refer to large motorcycles, and in particular
to those manufactured by Harley. At first, Harley was not entirely content
with the association of its products with the term "hog," since that term
had become identified with some of the more unsavory motorcycle enthusiasts.
Later, however, Harley changed its corporate mind and decided that the
association of the term "hog" with its brawny motorcycles was, on balance,
positive. Accordingly, it sought and obtained trademark registration for
the term "hog," used in connection with motorcycle products and services.
Despite the registration of the mark,
the appeals court concluded that the term "hog" had become generically
associated with all large motorcycles, not only those manufactured and
sold by Harley. No protection could be claimed by Harley for the term "hog"
and thus there could be no infringement by the defendant in using that
term in the context of his motorcycle repair business. While a rose may
always be a rose, a hog is not always a Harley.
The defendant's unauthorized use
of Harley's design mark was quite another matter. The defendant claimed
it was merely using the mark as a parody of the Harley name and identity.
A lawful use of a trademark as a parody must comment on or inform the original
use of the mark by the mark's owner. Here, the defendant was using the
alleged parody not to comment on Harley's mark but instead to sell a competing
service, because Harley's authorized dealers also provide motorcycle service
and parts. The court concluded that the defendant's use of the mark infringed
Harley's design mark.
In addition, the defendant's use
of the phrase "Unauthorized Dealer" was not sufficient to disclaim association
with Harley-Davidson. Rarely will the use of a disclaimer be sufficient
to avoid the possibility of confusion and thus the defendant was found
liable for infringement.
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REAL
ESTATE
Fair Housing
Act
The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits
discrimination in housing because of race or color, national origin, religion,
sex, handicap, or familial status. Familial status refers to the discriminatory
treatment of pregnant women, or of parents or legal custodians of children
under the age of 18. The Act applies to most kinds of housing, but there
are exemptions for owner-occupied buildings with no more than four units,
single-family housing sold or rented without a broker, and housing operated
by private organizations that limit occupancy to members.
The Act prohibits a broad range of
discriminatory conduct. Regarding the sale and rental of housing, for example,
no one can, on the basis of any of the protected classifications: refuse
to rent or sell housing; refuse to negotiate for housing; set different
terms or conditions for obtaining housing; provide different housing services
or facilities; or falsely deny that housing is available for inspection,
sale, or rental. It is also illegal to threaten, coerce, intimidate, or
interfere with anyone exercising a fair housing right or assisting others
to exercise such rights. Advertising for renters or buyers (or other statements)
may not indicate a limitation or a preference based on a protected category,
even
as to single-family and owner-occupied housing that is otherwise exempt.
A person claiming to have been victimized
by discrimination prohibited by the Fair Housing Act can file an administrative
complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. If the
matter is not resolved by that means, it will be heard in an administrative
hearing or, at the option of either side, in federal district court. Or,
the complaining party may go straight into federal or state court at his
or her own expense. Either procedural track can lead to an award of damages,
injunctive relief, and recovery of attorney's fees and costs if violations
of the Act are proven.
A recent decision by an administrative
law
judge illustrates the breadth of coverage under the Act. Gayle, a single
mother of a 12-year-old son who lived with her, responded to an advertisement
for renting an apartment that was one of two units in a duplex. The owners
occupied the other unit. While describing the apartment to Gayle over the
phone, one of the owners stated, "This apartment has a pool, so we don't
want children or pets." Gayle responded that, given her son's age, the
pool was not dangerous. The owners stood their ground.
Since the owners occupied one-half
of the duplex, they were free to discriminate with impunity in renting
the apartment. They remained subject, however, to the Act's prohibition
on making a statement with respect to rental of a dwelling that indicated
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on familial status.
According to the judge, the violated
section of the Act gives persons seeking housing the right to inquire about
its availability without having to endure the insult of discriminatory
statements. In her view, the owners' comment rejecting anyone with children
because of the pool was such a statement. The statement expressed a blanket
ban on renting to a family with a child or children, even if it stemmed
from a concern for the safety of children. The judge stated that the decision
on whether a dwelling poses unacceptable risks to a child is for the prospective
tenant/parent to make. Gayle and her son were awarded damages for emotional
distress, and a civil penalty was assessed against the apartment owners.
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ELDER
LAW
Protecting
Nursing Home Residents from Eviction
The costs of nursing home care for
the elderly are such that over one-half of all nursing home residents at
some point exhaust their assets and require the assistance of Medicaid
coverage. Medicaid patients are generally less profitable for the homes
than "private-pay" patients, who can afford to pay more for the cost of
their care.
In some cases, nursing homes have
been prompted by concerns over the bottom line to evict residents whose
bills are being paid by Medicaid. Congress responded with the Nursing Home
Resident Protection Amendments of 1999. The new law seeks to provide elderly
residents some security against eviction, while recognizing that nursing
homes need some flexibility in order to remain financially sound.
The legislation may be a small modification,
but it has big consequences for many nursing home residents. It prevents
nursing homes that voluntarily decide to withdraw from Medicaid, as is
their prerogative, from evicting current residents who are receiving Medicaid
assistance or who subsequently qualify for Medicaid.
As for residents who arrive after
a home's withdrawal from Medicaid, a facility must give oral and written
notice to the new residents that they could be forced to move if they eventually
run out of money and are unable to pay for their care, even though they
have become eligible for Medicaid benefits. The facility also must obtain
from the new residents a signed acknowledgement of receipt of such information.
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SKYBOX
DEDUCTIONS
A Nebraska corporation made a substantial
contribution to a university for a skybox being built in the university's
football stadium. Resolving a dispute over deductibility of the contribution,
the IRS has ruled that 80% of the contribution is deductible as a charitable
contribution where, as in the case before it, the donor receives the rights
to purchase tickets for seating in the skybox at athletic events. Amounts
representing the value of ticket purchases, the right to use the skybox,
passes to visit the skybox, and parking privileges are not deductible as
charitable contributions.
The general rule is that a charitable
contribution made in exchange for goods and services is deductible if the
taxpayer intends to make a payment that exceeds the value of the goods
and services, and the payment actually does exceed the value of the goods
and services. Taxpayers may rely on the allocation made by the university
in determining the value of a lease for a suite or a skybox received in
exchange for a contribution. The end result is that the value of the benefits
received by the donor is subtracted from the contribution, and 80% of that
difference qualifies as a charitable deduction.
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